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During his sixteen years in power Vladimir Putin has enjoyed high approval 
ratings. Despite a recent deterioration of Russia’s economy the President 
remains very popular. The research paper studies the possible effect of 
allegedly threatening media content on the support for Putin using survey 
experiments conducted on the streets of Moscow. The study explores whether 
experimentally induced anxiety may influence citizens’ support for a 
controversial internet censorship policy, and that, in turn, can help to 
understand whether people may alter their attitudes based on the frightening 
signals from media. The experimental evidence suggests that priming may 
induce confusion-anxiety emotions. The threatening effect of media content 
elicited by priming was not detected. The framing of internet censorship policy 
has merely a moderate effect on tested attitudes, suggesting that the level of 
Putin’s public support may not be that high. 
Keywords 
Putin, survey experiment, media effects, terror management theory. 
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 On President Putin’s popularity1 
Evidence from survey experiment on the streets of Moscow 
1 Introduction 
During his sixteen years in power as President and Prime Minister of Russia, 
Vladimir Putin has enjoyed high approval ratings. Despite a recent 
deterioration of people’s living standards influenced by economic sanctions 
and weakening of the Ruble the Russian president remains very popular. 84 
percent of citizens expressed their consent with Putin’s performance in 
October 2016 ('Putin approval Rating' 2016). The independent opinion pollster 
Levada-Center and think-tank Carnegie Moscow Center suggested some 
possible explanations for the persistence of Putin’s popularity. The sociologists 
voiced an opinion that as Russian media content was portraying hostilities of 
“war and terror” in the world around Russia, the “defensive efforts” of Putin’s 
external politics became the stimulating factors of high public support of the 
president’s actions (Gudkov 2016, Kolesnikov 2016). The effect of media 
coverage displaying a threat on consolidated citizens’ support for the leader 
was conceptualized as a phenomenon of rallying-around-the-flag against a 
common enemy (Snegovaya 2015, Gudkov 2016, Guriev and Treisman 2015, 
Kolesnikov 2016).  
This research paper examines the possible effect of media content that 
portrays a threat on the support for President Putin by using a novel 
experimental strategy. The study aims to find out whether experimentally 
induced anxiety may influence people’s support for a particular issue and that, 
in turn, can help to understand whether people may alter their beliefs and 
attitudes based on the frightening signals from media. This investigation can 
provide insights on how threatening media content may assist in building 
public support for leaders. 
Previous studies have suggested that the media play an important role in 
forming people’s beliefs and attitudes, influencing their political preferences 
and shaping public opinion (Entman 1989, Gunther 1998, McCombs and 
Stroud 2014, Shanahan and Morgan 2004). Given the suggested power of the 
media, various scholars have argued that state-controlled Russian media outlets 
1 This research has been the result of a learning process, which has been encouraged 
and supported by certain great individuals and intellectuals that I would hereby like to 
thank: 
- Dr. Matthias Rieger, my supervisor, whose genuine guidance helped me greatly to 
structure my research and motivated me to strive for research excellence; 
- Professor Arjun Bedi, my second reader, for his consistent support and critical 
comments, which guided my final steps in the research process; 
- all participants of my survey experiment, for giving me their trust to interview them 
on a sensitive topic; 
- my husband and daughters for the patience and continuous understanding. 
 
Address correspondence to Margarita Mecheva: margarita.mecheva@gmail.com 
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 use a narrative of fear to portray Russia as a “besieged fortress” in order to 
promote and maintain high public support for President Vladimir Putin and 
his internal and external policies (Snegovaya 2015, Hansen 2015, Gudkov 
2016, Guriev and Treisman 2015).  
At the same time a recent deterioration of the Russian economy was 
expected to have had a negative impact on Putin’s ratings (Guriev and 
Treisman 2015). This, however, did not happen. The rating has stayed above 
80 percent since 2014 and remained strong. The continuously high citizens’ 
consent with Putin’s politics raised certain concerns about the credibility of 
Russian public opinion polls in general and their methodology in particular. 
Some scholars have pointed out the inability of direct questioning methods to 
elicit truthful answers to sensitive survey questions (Blair et al. 2014, Colton 
and Hale 2009, Kalinin 2014, Treisman 2011, Treisman, 2014). Frye et al. 
(2016) however, conducted list experiments and compared measurement of 
Putin approval rating by direct (opinion poll survey technique) and indirect 
(experimental) questioning. The researcher found little evidence that the rating 
was inflated by the so-called social desirability bias, which usually occurs when 
people either do not answer the sensitive question or hide their oppositional 
views by providing responses that are in line with the view of the majority. The 
evidence provided by Frye et al. (2016) suggested that Putin approval ratings 
are genuine and reflect the real attitudes of Russian citizens. 
The psychological foundations of the effects of existential threats on 
people’s behavior have been studied under the ambit of Terror Management 
Theory (Greenberg et al. 1997). Terror Management Theory suggests that since 
humans’ ultimate aim is to survive, a conscious understanding that death is 
inevitable creates “an ever-present potential for intense anxiety, or terror” 
(Arndt et al. 2002, Greenberg et al. 1997). People might manage this “terror” 
by supporting and protecting their in-group values and beliefs (so-called 
worldviews) and by keeping faith in their leaders (Arndt et al. 2002, Cohen et 
al. 2004, Cohen et al. 2005, Echebarria Echabe and Perez 2015, Greenberg et 
al. 1997, Landau et al. 2004).  
The effect of existential threats on people’s faith in the shared worldviews 
and attitudes towards political leaders has been extensively studied (Burke et al. 
2010). Following Becker’s suggestion (Becker 1971, Becker 1973) that 
awareness about one’s own death might explain their search for symbolic 
protection through attraction to the “great leader, God, and country” in 
“participating in a heroic triumph over evil” (Greenberg and Arndt 2012: 408), 
various researchers explored the effects of death-related stimuli on the support 
for the group’s worldviews and charismatic leaders. 
For example, Landau et al. (2004) in a series of laboratory experiments in 
the USA found that when people were exposed to death-related questions and 
9/11 stimuli they demonstrated higher support for President Bush and his 
counterterrorism policies. The authors of the study suggested that the priming 
of external threat might play a facilitating role to induce death-related thoughts 
and to “intensify in-group favoritism and unanimity” in support of a leader and 
his/her policies, which are said to protect the country (Landau et al. 2004: 
1148). However, the study was not able to detect a single effect of rally-round-
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 the flag against a common enemy on support for President Bush (Landau et al. 
2004: 1147). 
Another example is the study of the effect of framing of media news on 
people’s support for military action against a hostile country. By conducting an 
experiment Gebauer et al. (2016) found evidence that threatening news 
increase the participant’s willingness for military expansion independently of 
the priming that induces death-related anxiety. Based on this finding the 
scholars suggested that media news, which use threatening framing, has the 
potential to increase people’s willingness to support military deployment in 
conflicts by producing similar “terror” anxiety effects in laboratory subjects 
(Gebauer et al. 2016). 
The application of Terror Management Theory to the Russian context 
may help to develop a better understanding of the grounds of President Putin 
approval ratings. In this respect, the validation of the terror management 
proposition may suggest that for many Russians the support for President 
Putin might perform as a cognitive buffer protecting from anxiety, which is not 
induced by Russia’s participation in the war per se, but by the ongoing 
confrontation with external enemies. 
The present study is built on the aforementioned laboratory evidence of 
the effects of death-related anxiety on the support for leaders and adherence to 
the cultural worldviews.  The paper aims to evaluate the impact of a narrative 
of threat used by Russian state-control media on Putin approval ratings. The 
research has three main objectives. Firstly, the study investigates whether 
experimental priming is able to induce anxiety in the survey respondents. 
Secondly, the research investigates whether priming affects respondents’ 
attitudes towards controversial policy. Thirdly, the study draws inferences 
about the potential role of the media in driving citizens’ support for Putin. 
The research paper makes use of a survey experiment conducted on the 
streets of Moscow in August 2016 by the author. In the experiment the passer-
by respondents were confronted with two priming conditions, asked to 
evaluate one of three frames of interest and answer other survey questions 
related to support for President Putin and various common beliefs and 
attitudes. The random change of priming conditions and frames across 
respondents, who were unaware of these changes, provided an exogenous 
variation, which permits estimation of the effect of priming on the response to 
each particular frame. The choice of the priming conditions was informed by 
the previous laboratory experiments and consisted of two carefully selected 
images – a terrorist attack and a person with dental pain. The framing 
statements were based on a recent anti-terrorism law2 and related to state 
2 So-called Yarovaya’s anti-terrorism law was adopted on July 1st 2016. According to 
this law, mobile and internet providers are required to store records of citizens’ 
communication and to provide assistance to security services to decode encrypted 
messages. Among other aspects, the law increases punishment for “extremism” and 
“mass disturbance” (‘Irina Yarovaya’s 'Anti-terrorist' War on Civil Rights: This Friday, 




                                                 
 control and internet censorship.  The pro-censorship attitudes were measured 
by the agreement with internet censorship per se (general frame), as well as 
when its necessity is endorsed by President Putin (endorsed frame) and when 
its implementation is framed as limiting the democratic freedoms (neutral 
frame).  
Thus, the study analyses, how media content portraying a threat, which is 
elicited through priming, may affect the responses to three censorship frames, 
which are used as proxies for Putin support. The research paper hypothesizes 
that if respondents who were exposed to the “Terrorist attack” priming were 
more likely to support censorship, then high Putin approval ratings may be 
attributed to the threatening media content. The paper also uses 
complimentary qualitative data on respondents’ evaluation of various Russian 
common worldviews, which were obtained during the survey interviews. 
The study discovered that threatening priming of the media may induce 
the confusion-anxiety emotions in its viewers, but may not affect their attitudes 
towards particular issue. At the same time, the framing effect of the media can 
be large, especially for certain subsets of population. The study results show 
that Putin’s public support may not be that high. The evidence suggests that 
framing experiment may help to infer the actual level of the President’s 
approval. The research paper concludes that although state-control media 
played a certain role in driving support for President Putin, his high approval 
rating might not be due to threatening content of mass communication. 
Possibly, in Russian context other aspects rather than threatening may assist in 
building public support for a leader. Putin’s charismatic personality and the 
perceived reestablishment of the “greatness” of Russia may have a stronger 
influence on people’s faith in the president than a search for symbolic 
protection against existential threats. 
The research paper makes three main contributions to the literature. 
Firstly, it contributes to the general discussion of the effects of media on the 
formation of public opinion. Secondly, the experimentally obtained evidence 
of threatening priming and framing adds to the literature on terror 
management. Thirdly, the paper contributes to the literature on experimental 
economics. It uses the data gathered during the field experiment. By involving 
actual subjects in their usual life situations rather than students in laboratory 
settings, this research has a potential to validate findings of previous studies. 
The research paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides some 
contextual background, such as current Putin’s approval rating, its genuineness 
and some theoretical explanations of the President’s popularity. Chapter 3 
reviews the literature on conceptualization of media effects and discusses 
evidence of their potential strength. It also analyses a few aspects of the terror 
management research relevant for the topic of present study. Chapter 4 
introduces and motivates methodology of the study, describes the survey 
experiment and the empirical approach. Chapter 5 presents the gathered 
experimental data and provides a descriptive analysis of respondents’ socio-
economic characteristics, media consumption and reported consent with 
Putin’s politics. Chapter 6 reports the main results of the study. Chapter 7 
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 discusses the results and compares them with findings of previous research. 
Chapter 8 concludes. 
2 Putin’s popularity 
The chapter provides some contextual background of the studied topic. It 
inspects the current Putin’s approval ratings measured by independent 
pollsters, and reviews studies of the genuineness, as well as outlines some 
theoretical explanations of the President’s popularity. 
2.1 Putin’s rating and the “rally-around-the-flag” 
During his 16 years in power as President and Prime Minister of Russia, 
Vladimir Putin has enjoyed high approval ratings. Figure 1 illustrates Putin’s 
popularity since March 2000 when he became President.  
Figure 1 
Putin approval ratings  
 
Question: “Do you in general approve or disapprove Putin's performance as a president of Russian 
Federation?” (‘Putin’s approval Rating’ 2016). 
 
The last peak of Putin’s popularity may be attributed to the Crimea 
annexation. Since then, his approval ratings have never fallen below than 80 
percent despite a deterioration of the Russian economy in Russia which might 
be expected to have had a negative impact on his ratings (Guriev and Treisman 
2015). This observation has raised some concerns about the credibility of 
surveys conducted in Russia as well as with the methodology used in opinion 
polls. The latter issue was related to so-called social desirability bias, which 
might occur when people are either afraid of persecutions for expressing a lack 
of support for the regime or tend to provide socially accepted answers. If 
people are aware that Putin has a high level of acceptance among Russian 
citizens, they might reinforce this acceptance by agreeing with it. As the 
President’s popularity becomes a norm shared by the majority of society, to 
elicit a truthful response by asking people directly could well become 
challenging (Blair et al. 2014, Colton and Hale 2009, Kalinin 2014, Treisman 
2011, Treisman, 2014). 
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 2.2 Genuineness of Putin’s popularity 
Frye at al. (2016) have conducted an experiment to evaluate Putin’s approval 
rating by comparing direct (used in opinion poll) and indirect (used in list 
experiments) questioning techniques. The authors have included both sets of 
questions in two waves of national omnibus surveys carried out monthly by 
Levada-Center. The direct questioning set contained four questions dedicated 
to reflect opinion towards various Russian political figures. The base of the 
questions was the same and represented a slightly modified version of the 
standard approval question used by Levada-Center since 2000 (Figure 1): “In 
general, do you support or not support the activities of [name]?” (Frye et al. 
2016: 6-7).  
The indirect questioning set was based on the item-count experimental 
technique (also known as a list experiment), in which randomly assigned to two 
groups respondents were provided with the list of political figures. The 
difference between two lists of names is an inclusion of a sensitive item – in 
this case, Putin. Interpretation of the results is straightforward: “differences in 
the mean responses… provide an estimate of the incidence of the sensitive 
item” (Frye et al. 2016: 7). For both parts of the study – direct and indirect, - 
authors used two lists of politicians. The first list contained the name of Putin 
and historical leaders of Russia and the USSR - Stalin, Brezhnev and Yeltsin. 
The second list included Putin together with other contemporary politicians – 
Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov and Mironov.  
The study found that Putin was supported by an “overwhelming majority 
of respondents” (86 percent in January and 88 percent in March 2015) and that 
signified “a continuation of the [ratings] trend” (Frye et al. 2016). However, the 
overall attractiveness of the historical figures and the contemporary politicians 
might have important implications. According to Levada-Center, 51 percent of 
Russians had a positive attitude towards Stalin, 37 and 17 percent - towards 
Brezhnev and Yeltsin, respectively (‘Эпохи в Жизни Страны: Ельцин, 
Горбачев, Брежнев (Eras in the Country's Life: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Brezhnev)’ 
2011). At the end 2014, Zhirinovsky was supported by 12 percent of the 
population, Zyuganov by 11 percent and Mironov by 3 percent (‘Октябрьские 
рейтинги одобрения и доверия (October Ratings of Approval and Trust)’ 
2016).  
As the sensitive attitude was “not supporting Putin”, his high popularity 
could further reduce the attractiveness of his “competitors” and bias the study 
results (Frye at al. 2016: 7-9). The authors conducted two “placebo” 
experiments to identify a possibility of artificial deflation bias, which might 
occur if respondents systematically under report support for non-sensitive 
items when the sensitive item is included. Artificial deflation might potentially 
inflate estimates of social desirability bias and underestimate the support for a 
sensitive item (Frye et al. 2016: 6). The researchers have found a possibility of 
artificial deflation bias that might yield lower estimates of Putin’s support. But 
the study provided no evidence that the estimates have not been biased 
upward due to the floor or ceiling effects of non-truthful support responses. 
The authors suggested that the results of opinion polls may provide only six to 
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 nine percentage points higher approval ratings than surveys that ask the 
support question indirectly (Frye et al. 2016: 11). The study concluded that 
Putin’s popularity was not affected by a social desirability bias and his approval 
ratings were genuine as they reflected the real attitudes of Russian citizens. 
2.3 Some theoretical explanations of people’s consent with 
Putin’s politics 
A closer look at Putin’s historical approval ratings (Figure 1) suggests that 
Putin’s approval ratings were driven by Russia’s involvement in conflict 
situations. The peaks of President’s popularity were documented in 2000 (first 
Chechen war), 2003 (internal “war with oligarch”), 2007-2008 (second 
Chechen war and the war with Georgia) and culminated in 2014 (Crimea 
annexation and Ukrainian conflict). The latter happened after a long decline of 
public consent with Putin’s politics that resulted in a series of mass protests. 
The Crimea operation has helped not only to bring back President’s popularity, 
but also has re-invigorated the long-forgotten notion of Russia as a “great 
power” (Volkov 2015). As various qualitative studies by Levada-Center have 
found, many Russians have started to proudly state that Russia has “showed 
[its] teeth” and “forced [the world] to respect [it]” (Gudkov 2016). At the same 
time, despite economic sanctions, a collapse of Ruble and deterioration of 
living standards, people’s satisfaction with the course of Putin’s politics 
remained high (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
Assessment of the current situation in Russia  
 
Question: “Are things in the country going in the right direction or is the country moving in the 
wrong direction?” (‘Putin’s approval Rating’ 2016). 
 
Guriev and Treisman (2015) have suggested that economic conditions 
might play an important role in public consent with the leader. The authors 
have analyzed various authoritarian regimes: Fujimori in Peru; Orban in 
Hungary; Mohamad in Malaysia; Erdogan in Turkey; and Putin in Russia to 
propose the determinants of their persistence. Their “competent ruler” thesis 
was based on the evidence that modern authoritarian regimes survive not 
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 because of ideology or mass repressions, but because the public perceives the 
leader as “competent”. The competence level of the leader, as suggested, might 
be reflected in his approval ratings (Guriev and Treisman (2015: 4). The leader 
might employ various tools to build this “competence”. While a country’s 
economy is flourishing the leader may have the means to invest in propaganda, 
censorship and co-optation of elites. Contrary, in case of an economic 
downturn and lack of resources available for other tools, the “ruler” might 
only be able to unite citizens in wars (often in only perceived ones) against 
external enemies. Thus, the ruler’s “perceived competence at securing 
prosperity and defending the nation against external threats” might become a 
ground for his popularity (Guriev and Treisman 2015: 2). 
The strength of the effect of rallying-around-the-flag on the president’s 
approval ratings may depend on how united all the public and the state are in 
their assessment of the country’s development (Zakharov 2015). The 
monopoly of the state’s voice in media may play a crucial role in determining 
public opinion. Television remains to be the main mass communication 
channel in Russia (Volkov and Goncharov 2014). Major national television 
networks are believed to be control by the Kremlin (Guriev and Treisman 
2015, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008, Snegovaya 2015). Some media outlets, 
such as the TV-channel and online magazine Dozhd’, radio station Echo of 
Moscow, the business daily Vedomosti, Moscow’s weekly Novaya Gazeta, 
online magazines Slon.ru and Snob.ru and news site Meduza have managed to 
keep their independence and continue voicing alternative to Kremlin’s opinion 
(Snegovaya 2015). However, their penetration is limited and the majority of 
Russians continue to trust the state television as a main source of information 
(‘Телевидение остается основным источником новостей (Television Remains 
the Main Source of News)’ 2016). Information conveyed by the state media 
outlets is often characterized as propaganda (Guriev and Treisman 2015, 
McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008, Snegovaya 2015).  It might be seen as a way to 
manipulate public opinion by providing an “alternative” viewpoint and by 
promoting anti-Western (mostly anti-American) sentiments (Guriev and 
Treisman 2015, Snegovaya 2015). Various researchers of the Russian media 
and public opinion noticed that the main messages of the state-controlled 
television and news agencies during at least the recent years of Putin’s 
presidency has been a message of the hostility of the world towards Russia. 
The confrontation with the West in general and with the United States in 
particular might have been the key grounds on which the notion of “external 
enemies” was created3. 
At the same time, the economic development may also affect the citizens’ 
political attitudes. The negative influence of economy on the support for a 
leader may depend on the degree of a “blur of responsibility” and the origins 
3 There are some “internal enemies” in Russia too. Generally, they can be described as 
those who aim to “destabilize” the country. Among them the “foreign agents” - 
various NGOs, which are funded from abroad and the list of which includes 




                                                 
 of economic issues (Zakharov 2015). According to Zakharov, these two effects 
create an ambivalent situation in Russia. On one hand, the vertical structure of 
the political power implies that the citizens might attribute the deterioration of 
economy to the actions of President Putin himself. On the other hand, the 
state controlled media ascribes the sources of economic stagnation to the 
external factors, such as oil prices and sanctions. The latter is suggested to 
protect the president from the potential “punishment” of the decline of his 
approval ratings (Zakharov 2015).   
In a situation where Russia could be facing the hostility of the world of 
“war and terror” around it, the “defensive efforts” of Putin’s actions could be a 
stimulating factor for people’s support of his politics (Gudkov 2016). As 
citizens feel united in supporting the leader of the “besieged fortress” of 
Russia, their “rallying-around-the-flag” may be the major influence on the 
maintenance of Putin’s popularity (Gudkov 2016, Guriev and Treisman 2015, 
Hansen 2015, Snegovaya 2015). 
3 Literature review 
The aim of this Chapter is to motivate the choice of empirical strategy, 
employed methods and aspects of interest of the present research. The chapter 
reviews the existing literature on media influence, including conceptualization 
of media effects and existing evidence of their potential strength. It provides 
an overview of terror management research and particular experiments 
relevant for the scope of the present paper.  
3.1 Conceptualization of media effects and existing 
evidence of their potential strength 
The review of the literature on media effects has two main objectives. Firstly, it 
aims to review the conceptualization and differentiation of possible media 
effects on the formation of public opinion. Secondly, the section provides a 
brief overview of existing evidence of the potential strength of these effects. 
Research of the influence of media on people’s opinion and attitudes 
towards political issues has a long history. It moves from studies of the media’s 
ability to reinforce pre-existing beliefs towards theoretical and experimental 
investigations of more complex relationships of media effects and behavioral 
outcomes (Entman 1989, Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, Scheufele and 
Iyengar 2012).  
General patterns of modern thinking about media effects can be found in 
the work of Robert Entman (1989). He was concerned with the previously 
argued limited influence of media on the formation of people’s political 
preferences and suggested that media are able to shape attitudes by 
communicating messages that contain a “partial selection of information for a 
person to think about” (Entman 1989: 349). For Entman not only the message 
itself, but also how people respond to it matters. Thus, the significant outcome 
of media influence on the attitudinal or behavioral change might only be 
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 achieved if the media message is “salient” and rebounded with individual’s 
existing conceptual “schemas” or beliefs (Entman 1989: 350). In this respect, 
for a media message to affect people’s attitude and to form a specific public 
opinion, the selectivity of information and repetition of communication may 
have a crucial role. 
The repetition and frequency of media communication were 
conceptualized as a “mainstreaming” effect of media in Gerbner’s theory of 
cultivation (Shanahan and Morgan 2004, Morgan and Shanahan 2010)4. The 
main proposition of the theory and its research interest was to provide 
evidence that heavy users of television or other media tend to perceive the 
world in way it was presented to them by the media (Shanahan and Morgan 
2004: 4). As media are repeatedly informing people about how the world is 
constructed and how it operates, the common public opinion, beliefs and 
attitudes are supposed to be cultivated (Shanahan and Morgan 2004: 15). 
Although the meta-analysis of various cultivation studies by Morgan and 
Shanahan were able to establish media contribution on alteration of people’s 
worldviews, they acknowledge that the effect of frequency of exposure to 
television messages might not be very large (Morgan and Shanahan 2010: 340). 
The average effect detected by the authors was around 0.10 (r = 0.078 in 
analyses with the dependent variable related to politics) (Shanahan and Morgan 
2004: 125). The researchers concluded that the analysis of 20 years of media 
research provides evidence that “cumulative exposure to television cultivates 
absorption of ideas and worldviews congruent with what is seen on TV” 
(Shanahan and Morgan 2004: 135).  
The researchers of agenda setting, priming and framing effects of mass 
media put forward alternative suggestions of how media may influence political 
judgments and attitudes. Agenda setting effect of media was suggested by 
McCombs who found out that the emphasis on a particular political issue put 
by the media is correlated with the importance of that issue for the public 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972, McCombs and Stroud 2014). McCombs and 
Stroud argued that agenda setting affects individuals differently, depending on 
their attitudinal predispositions and media consumption habits (2014: 85-88). 
The latter included individual preferences in media selection, personal 
intentions and ways to process information (McCombs and Stroud 2014: 88). 
The earlier study of McCombs and Shaw found evidence that voters in the 
presidential campaign of 1968 “tend to share the media composite definition 
of what is important” (1972: 182). That finding suggested that agenda setting 
could have a large and positive effect on public opinion formation (the 
correlation coefficient may range from r = 0.80 to r = 0.89), as media may 
become “the main primary sources of national political information” 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972: 185). The further study of McCombs and Stroud 
discovered that the opinions of individuals that use a few media channels and 
those who use only one may vary (2014: 87). For instance, the probability of 
4 Although initially the theory was concerned with particular effect of television, 
Shanahan and Morgan tried to extend it to other media as well: “[a]s the scene 
changes, the story remains the same” (2004: 219). 
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 agreement with the tested worldview was higher for viewer of both Fox News 
and CNN (r = 0.72) than for viewers of only Fox News (r = 0.63), while it was 
lower comparing to viewers of only CNN (r = 0.80) (McCombs and Stroud 
2014: 87).  
The studies by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) suggested that socio-economic 
characteristics of media viewers were less significant in determining people’s 
sensitivity to media agenda setting. Assuming that the change in attitude was 
only possible when a media message is both received and accepted by people, 
the authors suggested that individual’s interest in political issues might play an 
important role in their responsiveness to media influence in setting political 
priorities (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 54-62).  
Another media effect is related to the so-called priming, which is defined 
as change in references people use for judgment and formation of attitudes 
towards particular issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 62-72). Since both agenda 
setting and priming aim to make the specific political issue more salient in 
people’s minds, some researchers treat priming as a case of agenda setting 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11). The difference between agenda setting 
and priming may be assigned to their respective outcome. When agenda setting 
emphasizes the particular issue to ensure people’s responsiveness to it, priming 
draws attention to specific aspects that people are supposed to take into 
account while making political judgments. Iyengar and Kinder described a 
useful example of priming effects:  “[w]hen primed by television news stories 
that focus on national defense, people judge the president largely by how well 
he has provided, as they see it, for the nation's defense” (1987: 114). As a 
result, agenda setting and priming may make a joint contribution to media 
influence on change in people’s attitudes: “[b]y making some issues more 
salient in people’s mind (agenda setting), mass media can also shape the 
considerations that people take into account when making judgments about 
political candidates or issues (priming)” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11).  
The differentiation of agenda setting and priming effects seems to be 
crucial in situations when both effects are evaluated. Priming and agenda 
setting may affect different people in opposite directions. In their experiments 
Iyengar and Kinder discovered that when the agenda setting had a bigger 
impact on individuals with lower political involvement, priming was effective 
for politically engaged people due to their “greater inclination toward 
performance-based evaluation” (1987: 96). 
Framing effects of media are different from its agenda setting and priming 
influence on people’s attitudes (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012, Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). Framing refers to the variety of presentations of an issue to 
the public, which, in turn, forms a particular opinion about it (Chong and 
Druckman 2007, Scheufele and Iyengar 2012).  This concept might be traced 
back to the experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky, who studied how 
the equal but differently presented decision-making plots might influence 
people’s preference for a particular outcome (1979, 1981, 1984). The different 
presentation of outcome choices was called “framing”. Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrated that “seemingly inconsequential changes in the formulation of 
choice problem caused significant shifts of preferences” (1981: 457).  
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 In media research framing of media content is a way to present 
information to the viewers using their existing beliefs and attitudes and to 
assign to this information a meaningful interpretation (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). The recent findings of the effects of media on the formation 
of people’s political attitudes suggested that those effects might be limited due 
to their dependence on people’s predispositions, susceptibility and ways to 
process information from media (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). Nevertheless, those effects persist and media are able to set 
the public agenda, prime people’s political choices and frame mass opinion.  
3.2 Terror Management Theory 
The potential outcome of the aforementioned media influence can be a power 
of mass communication to reinforce public acceptance of the leader and 
adherence to particular worldviews promoted by his politics. By portraying the 
vulnerability of world peace and stability by informing the public about real 
and perceived enemies, media may provoke feelings of existential threats 
(Gebauer at al. 2016, Landau et al. 2004, Lecheler et al. 2013). The 
psychological foundations of the effects of existential threats on people’s 
behavior have been studied under the ambit of Terror Management Theory 
(Greenberg et al. 1997). This section reviews key aspects of Terror 
Management Theory and outlines findings of various studies of effects of 
anxiety-related emotions on support for political leaders. 
Terror Management Theory was developed by Greenberg, Solomon and 
Pyszczynski, who were inspired by Ernst Becker’s interdisciplinary work on 
human motivation and behavior (Greenberg et al. 1997, Greenberg and Arndt 
2012). The theory aimed to explain the role the culture and social behavior 
plays in people’s need for self-preservation caused by understanding of one’s 
vulnerability and inevitable death. According to the theory people are able to 
control the death-related thoughts by creating a shared world of meaning and 
by keeping faith in common conception of reality. These cultural worldviews, 
as suggested, serve two goals. Firstly, they buffer mortality-related anxiety by 
promising protection through spiritual concepts of immortality and 
maintenance of culture. Secondly, they provide a motivation for nurturing self-
esteem by identification with social group and associated beliefs, attitudes and 
values.  
Years of experimental study in the context of Terror Management Theory 
have demonstrated that cultural worldviews and self-esteem serve as a defense 
against death-related anxiety. In this respect, the reminders of death might 
affect how people react to other individuals or particular ideas that challenge 
their cultural worldviews (Greenberg et al. 1997, Greenberg and Arndt 2012). 
Various experiments have shown that when people were reminded about death 
they responded favorably to the situations and individuals, which were 
consistent with their group’s worldviews, and unfavorably to those, who were 
threatening them (Greenberg et al. 1997, Burke et al. 2010). These effects of 
threatening priming (mortality salience) on faith in common beliefs and values 
(worldviews) were suggested to be exclusively associated with people’s 
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 unconscious fear of death (Greenberg et al. 1997). Next section provides a 
review of the meta-analysis study of terror management research. 
 
Meta-analysis study by Burke et al. (2010) 
The study by Burke et al. (2010) provides a useful review of the experiments 
conducted within 20 years of existence of Terror Management Theory. The 
authors analyzed 164 up-to-date articles, which empirically tested the mortality 
salience hypotheses in 277 experiments. 
The aim of the analysis was to evaluate the size of the effects produced by 
mortality salience manipulations and their potential moderators such as the 
region of the study, respondents’ characteristics, type of priming and 
dependent measurements. 277 studied experiments were conducted with on 
average 22 years old (a range from 7 to 84) students (90 percent of the 
experiments). The average experiment had on average 87 participants (a range 
from 17 to 343). More than a half of experiments was conducted in USA (52 
percent), a bit more than one third in Europe (37 percent) and 4 percent in 
Asia. Some sporadic experiments were carried out in Canada, New Zealand, 
Iran and Costa Rica (Burke et al. 2010: 157, 177).  The authors estimated the 
overall effect of mortality salience manipulations (r(276) = 0.35, p < 0.015) 
(Burke et al. 2010: 179). 
The researchers have discovered that mortality salience is manipulated in 
four ways: (1) answer to two standard death essay questions to describe one’s 
own death and emotions that thought might provoke (80 percent of all 
experiments used this priming method); (2) answer to 31 closed-ended survey 
questions about reasons to fear the death (7 percent of experiments); (3) brief 
exposure to death-related words during a computer-based test of relationship 
between ordinary words (4 percent); (4) exposure to video materials, pictures 
or texts related to accidents, diseases, war or terrorist acts (9 percent of 
experiments) (Burke et al. 2010: 177).  The evidence of the analysis suggested 
that the type of priming has no influence on the strength of the effects of 
mortality salience (Burke et al. 2010: 182). For instance, the effects of the 
standard death essays (r(220) = 0.36, p < 0.01) were similar to the effects of 
other mortality salience manipulations such as subliminal death primes (r(10) = 
0.35, p < 0.01) or death-related videos or slide shows (r(24) = 0.29, p < 0.01) 
(Burke et al. 2010: 182). 
For the control condition the majority of experiments (62 percent) used 
threatening or negative topics such as dental pain or exam failure (Burke et al. 
2010: 178). Interestingly, the meta-analysis of Burke et al. (2010) has found that 
the threat level of the control topic had no influence on the strength of the 
effect of mortality salience. Manipulations with mortality primes produced 
effects of similar magnitudes in both types of experiments – those that used 
5 Burke et al. (2010) calculated r as a difference of means between control and 
mortality salience condition divided by the pooled standard deviation. Therefore r 
used in their meta-analysis is the same as Cohen’s d. 
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 threats (for example, pain) (r(171) = 0.36, p < 0.01)  and those that made 
comparison with the neutral control conditions (for example, leisure and food 
surveys or exam) (r(104) = 0.33, p < 0.01) (Burke et al. 2010: 182). Therefore, 
the authors have suggested, death might have a unique impact on people’s 
beliefs and attitudes and that impact might not be merely due to its high 
negativity of threat (Burke et al. 2010: 182).  
This “qualitative” difference of death also addressed a main critique of 
Terror Management Theory (Burke et al. 2010: 178). Some competing 
explanations of the drivers of people’s adherence to common worldviews 
postulated that other factors, which could threaten people, might produce 
effects on people’s attitude and behavior similar to mortality salience (Burke et 
al. 2010: 182). Burke et al. have tested some alternative threats - such as 
“uncertainty” and “loss of meaning” (2010: 182). On one hand, the authors 
found limited evidence in favor of “loss of meaning” type of explanations.  On 
the other hand, mortality salience primes produced similar strength of the 
effects in experiments, which used “uncertainty” as a control topic, and in 
experiments that used, for example, “dental pain” primes. This finding allowed 
the authors to argue in favor of the mortality salience proposition (Burke et al. 
2010: 184). 
Regarding the types worldviews used in studied experiments, the meta-
analysis by Burke et al has found that death related priming had significantly 
bigger impact on attitudes towards particular persons than other attitudes 
(towards a country or a text, for example) (2010: 184, 186). The authors 
suggested that personalization of threat or support of people’s worldviews 
might have a stronger effect due to the social orientation of people’s behavior 
(Burke et al. 2010: 186). 
The last but not least aspect noticed in the study by Burke et al. (2010) was 
the specific of the selected samples. The majority of experiments (90 percent) 
used students as their subjects. Young people during the period of college 
study might be different from the studied populations both in their socio-
economic characteristics and in the ability to be persuaded by experimental 
manipulations (Burke et al. 2010: 181). The effects on non-students were 
significantly smaller – r(25) = 0.25, p < 0.01 (Burke et al. 2010: 181). As the age 
range of most of the studies was 17-27 years old, the reviewed meta-analysis 
could not define the effects of mortality salience manipulation on older adults. 
 
Study of presidential support in times of increased threats of 
terrorism 
The present research investigates the effects of threatening media on the 
support for President Putin. Nowadays, the threat of terrorism is one of the 
main issues that Russia faces6. Therefore, the studies that use manipulations 
6 Levada-Center reported that 82 percent of their respondents felt anxious about 
potential threats of terrorism in October 2015 (before October 2015 the share of 
those was 48 percent) (Kolesnikov 2016). 
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 with terrorism-related primes to offer explanations about the grounds of the 
support for political leaders are of a greater interest. Among those studies in 
the ambit of Terror Management Theory is the study by Landau et al. (2004).  
In a series of experiments Landau et al. (2004) have tested the effects of 
mortality salience priming on support for President Bush and his antiterrorism 
policies. The previous studies have suggested that increased level of awareness 
about own death, facilitate people’s support for powerful leaders, who are 
supposed to provide security and protection (Cohen et al. 2004, Cohen et al. 
2005, Pyszczynski et al. 2003). On the one hand, Terror Management Theory 
suggested that mortality salience manipulations might activate people’s faith in 
cultural worldviews and own valued participation in the society. On the other 
hand, people might seek to transfer a defensive role to a charismatic leader, 
who, in turn, might be seen as a protector of the group’s prosperity and 
worldview superiority. Landau et al. (2004) have hypothesized that heightened 
approval rating of President Bush just after 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA might 
be derived from the needs of American citizens for such symbolic defenses. 
A particular aspect of the paper by Landau et al. (2004) is of interest to the 
present research. The authors used terrorism-related frames and primes to 
infer support for Bush and his anti-terrorism policies. As Landau et al. (2004) 
reported, in their experiments 9/11-related stimuli produced similar effect as 
mortality salience primes traditionally used in the terror management research.  
The authors have found the evidence that terrorism-related priming and death 
reminders equally resulted in higher support for President Bush and his 
counterterrorism policies. Comparing to the exam control condition, 
manipulations with 9/11-related primes had a large effect on the support for 
Bush (t(72) = 9.31, p < 0.001,  (Landau et al. 2004: 1143). That 
finding allowed Landau et al. (2004) to suggest that when people are reminded 
of their own mortality (either by the standard mortality salience manipulations 
or by 9/11-related primes) they might seek the protection of the familiar world 
order by the leader, and that, in turn, might be supportive evidence for Terror 
Management Theory. 
The experiments by Landau et al. (2004) have yielded another observation, 
interesting for the present study. The authors have found that death-related 
primes activated support for Bush but not for his counterpart Kerry. Some 
explanations have been suggested – three related to specific qualities that Bush 
might possess and one related to in-group unanimity. Firstly, Bush’ status as 
the president of United States might make him more appealing when common 
American worldviews were under a threat. Secondly, Bush’ self-confidence and 
patriotic rhetoric might characterize his leadership style as charismatic, and 
that, might make his candidacy more preferable under existential threats, as 
evidence of other studies tried to establish (for example, Cohen et al. 2004). 
Thirdly, security and military defense promoted by Bush’ policies might also 
give rise to his attractiveness. Fourthly, the effect of “rally-around-the-flag” 
might increase in-group unity under the threat of external enemy and justify 
higher approval rates for the president. The latter aspect did not get a strong 
support by the empirical evidence of the reviewed experiments since terrorism-
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 related priming and induction of an external enemy threat have not been 
consistent across conducted experiments and groups under treatment. 
 
Study of emotional response to death-related primes 
The previous terror management research had suggested that accessibility of 
death-related thoughts triggers anxiety, which people buffer by sticking to 
common worldviews (in-group values and beliefs) and by exhibiting defensive 
attitudes. This sub-section reviews a study that has investigated the role of 
emotions in transmission of the effects of existential threats on people’s 
support for various worldviews. A novel approach suggested by Echebarria 
Echabe and Perez (2015) may be a convenient alternative for measurement of 
death-thoughts accessibility in field experiments. 
The reviewed paper has used emotions as mediators of priming effect on 
the outcome of interest. Similar to the traditional word-completion test (Burke 
et al. 2010), measurement of emotional response might allow to compare the 
effect of different procedures to induce death-related anxiety on the variety of 
common worldviews through the emotional response it might produce. 
Additionally, the paper provides a useful overview of the effects of different 
stimuli, which might have different influence on people’s support for particular 
worldviews.  
In the laboratory experiment with undergraduate university students, 
Echebarria Echabe and Perez assigned 39 male and 103 female participants to 
six experimental conditions – control (dental pain) and 5 treatments (suicide of 
young woman, self-suicide, young woman killed in the car accident, dying old 
man in a hospital room and running people and bodies of victims in the 
terrorist attack in the railway station in Madrid) (2015: 394). All groups7 were 
exposed to particular images, asked to express what they felt physically and 
emotionally and requested to evaluate the extent of their emotion. Next, the 
researchers conducted a word-completion test, in which the participants were 
supposed to fill the letters in incomplete words8 Echebarria Echabe and Perez 
(2015) also measured self-esteem as a potential mediator along with emotions 
and death-thoughts accessibility, but this aspect of their study is not covered in 
the current review. The outcomes of interests consisted of 19 worldviews, 
including European identity, superiority of European culture, incompatibility 
of Arab culture, government spending on immigrants and others (Echebarria 
Echabe and Perez 2015: 394).  
The experiment by Echebarria Echabe and Perez has allowed the authors 
to suggest that only terrorist attack priming has been able to directly affect 
people’s inclination towards Eurocentrism and xenophobia attitudes,  
7 Excluding self-suicide condition in which participants were asked to imagine that 
situation happening to them. 
8 Six of those words could be filled in both “positive” and “negative” way as per 
analogy with traditional “death access measures” suggested by Terror Management 
researchers. For example, S K _ _ L could be both SKILL and SKULL ('Research 
Materials: Mortality Salience (MS) Manipulation' 2008). 
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 , p < 0.01 (2015: 395). Comparing the emotional response to the 
primes, the study provided evidence that anxiety feelings have had both a 
direct and an indirect influence on xenophobic attitudes9. The authors have 
concluded that, as they had expected, different death-related priming 
conditions might have different effects on various dimensions of people’s 
worldviews. Emotions might have a considerable influence in that process. 
 
Study of media effects within a course of Terror Management 
Theory 
The paper reviewed in this sub-section combines a study of media framing 
effects (section 3.1) with the classical approach of terror management research 
(section 3.2). Gebauer et al. (2016) have questioned the ability of media 
framing to induce explicit existential threats that could have a similar effect on 
people’s attitudes as classical terror management’s death-related anxiety.  
The authors were interested whether threatening news coverage might be 
comparable to the existential threats induced by the classical terror 
management priming in their influence on people’s support for military 
engagement in the conflict. The study used the data obtained in the laboratory 
experiment with 112 German students (77 females) (Gebauer et al. 2016). The 
participants were exposed to two priming conditions – treatment (classical two 
death essay questions to describe one’s own death and emotions that thought 
might provoke), and control (“dental pain” in same “imaginary” format as a 
treatment condition). The authors have used two versions of the article from 
Der Spiegel magazine to evaluate the effect of media framing – one version 
was the original one and provided explicit calls for NATO expansion at the 
Russian border, another version was edited to mute potential threats. The 
participants of the experiment were assigned to four groups and asked to read 
either the original or the neutral article being under either “dental pain” or 
“mortality salience” priming. 
The study by Gebauer et al. (2016) suggested that threatening media 
coverage might influence people’s willingness to military engagement in the 
conflict (t(110) = 2.27, p = 0.025), and that effect (d = 0.43) might be 
comparable to the one produced by mortality salience primes used in the 
classical Terror Management research. The classical effects of mortality 
salience manipulations were observed only in non-militant article as the 
participants showed an increased willingness for military deployment only after 
manipulation with existential threats (t(52) = 2.48, p = 0.016, d = 0.70) 
(Gebauer et al. 2016: 6). The latter finding is similar to the previous terror 
management research, in which the classical mortality salience effects were 
9 To compare direct and indirect effect of primes on outcomes of interest Echebarria 
Echabe and Perez (2015) used a mediation model suggested by Hayes and Preacher 
(Hayes et al. 2016). This model provides a way to analyze an impact of treatment 
conditions on outcome directly and indirectly through intervening effect of a 




                                                 
 observed only in experiments with neutral, not explicitly threatening frames 
(Burke et al. 2010). 
The reviewed experiential evidence of previous studies informed the 
strategy and methods of the present research. The experiment presented by the 
paper used “Terrorist attack” and “Dental pain” priming conditions as 
suggested by the papers by Landau et al. (2004) and Echebarria Echabe and 
Perez (2015). Similarly to the approach of the experiment of Gebauer at al. 
(2016) the “Terrorist attack” priming might represent the potentially 
threatening media effects. In order to evaluate the degree of the threat induced 
by the priming the present experiment employed the measurement of 
emotional response, as suggested by Echebarria Echabe and Perez (2015). 
Moreover, the participants of the experiment were evaluating terrorism-related 
frames, which potentially could have an influence on the tested attitudes 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, Scheufele and Iyengar 2012). The paper of 
Landau et al. (2004) informed the choice of the terrorism-related topic of the 
frames. The main difference of the current research is that it uses data obtained 
in field experiments. Although a laboratory experiment with motivated subjects 
may help to allocate enough time for priming exercise, ensure attention focus 
on subtle cues, and provide insightful results, it may potentially hamper 
external validity of the results (Levitt and List 2007).  
4 Experimental design and empirical strategy 
This research paper makes use of a survey experiment, ex post survey and 
econometric analyses to study the effect of threatening media content on 
support for President Putin and adherence to common Russian worldviews. 
The decision to use field experiment as a main approach of empirical strategy 
was motivated by the potential sensitivity of the topic related to evaluation of a 
popular leader in an authoritarian context.  As the approval rating of Putin is 
very high, asking explicit questions is unlikely to yield truthful answers (Blair et 
al. 2014, Frye et al. 2016). 
Moreover, people may support Putin, but still be against some of his 
policies, and the other way around – not support Putin but endorse particular 
policies. To address this concern, the experiment uses three frames related to 
controversial internet censorship policies. The choice of internet censorship 
was motivated by two considerations. Firstly, potential threat of terrorism is a 
salient issue in Russia. 61 percent of Russians reported that they were afraid of 
terrorism in March 2016 (‘Россияне Боятся Террактов, но Верят в Свои 
Спецслужбы (Russians are Afraid of Terrorist Acts But Trust Their 
Intelligence Services)’ 2016). At the same time a threat of terrorism is used by 
Russian legislature to justify the restrictions in internet sphere (see Chapter 1). 
Secondly, internet censorship satisfies the characteristics of the question of 
framing or endorsement experiment suggested Blair et al. (2014). The topic 
itself is a well-known issue in Russia and it generates a variety of attitudes 
(‘Интернет-Цензура (Censorship of Internet)’ 2014). According to the survey 
of WCIOM (‘Чего Желает Общество: Стремление Россиян к Контролю 
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 Интернета (What the Society Wishes: Intention of Russians to Control 
Internet)’ 2015), half of Russians supports the censorship of internet (49 
percent of total population and 43 percent of the internet users). Moreover, 31 
percent of respondents agreed that internet may have a “harmful influence” 
(55 percent of non-users) and 41 percent supported the statement that 
restrictions in internet affect their personal freedom (‘Чего Желает Общество: 
Стремление Россиян к Контролю Интернета (What the Society Wishes: 
Intention of Russians to Control Internet)’ 2015). 
Therefore, to elicit responses that permit a credible analysis of the effect 
of threatening media content on the support for President Putin, the survey 
experiment used three internet censorship frames, which were randomly 
assigned to the respondents under priming conditions. Importantly, the 
respondents were not aware of randomization and in all other aspects they 
were treated in the same way, including additional survey questions and 
methods of data analysis. The following sections provide the details of the 
experimental design. 
4.1 Survey experiment 
331 face-to-face interviews were conducted on Moscow streets in August 2016. 
The locations were selected based on the following criteria: proximity to metro 
stations, residential areas, shopping centers, and office buildings (see Picture 1 
in Annex I). The potential respondents all met the following criteria: were 
alone and did not use mobile telephone or other digital devices. The 
recruitment of respondents was conducted right before the experiment by 
random selection among potential respondents. For it, every fifth person 
satisfying the criteria of a potential respondent in the field of vision of the 
researcher was contacted. In cases when the approached person refused to 
participate in the survey, the next fifth person was approached. 
The questionnaires were printed and mixed in advance to ensure 
randomization of allocation of priming conditions and three frames of interest. 
Therefore, under which priming condition and which one of the frames the 
particular respondent was supposed to evaluate has been determined by 
random assignment. In all other aspects, the respondents were treated in the 
same way, including all other survey questions and following methods of data 
analysis. 
The minimum required sample size of 330 observations was calculated 
assuming 80% power at 5% significance level and using estimation of 
minimum detectable effects based on the evidence suggested by the previous 
studies. Thus, considering the minimum detectable effect of 28 percentage 
points from the paper by Landau et al. (2004), 33 percent of the current 
support for censorship from the recent survey by WCIOM (‘Чего Желает 
Общество: Стремление Россиян к Контролю Интернета (What the Society 
Wishes: Intention of Russians to Control Internet)' 2015), and 20 percent of 
the maximum attrition rate suggested by Blair et al. (2014) for direct 
questioning, a minimum required sample size for each sample cell (priming 
condition and one of the censorship frames) is estimated to be 55 
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 observations. Assuming the same variance of the outcome means for priming 
conditions, the respondents were allocated to treatment and control cells 
equally as illustrated in Table 1. 
The survey consisted of three parts. In the first part, the respondents were 
randomly exposed to two priming conditions. In the second part, they were 
asked to evaluate one of three randomly assigned frames of interest. In the last 
third part, the respondents answered additional survey questions. 
Table 1 
Number of respondents for priming and frames allocation 






Frame 1: “Internet censorship to fight against the terrorism” 55 55 
Frame 2: “President Putin endorses internet censorship to fight 
against the terrorism” 
55 55 
Frame 3: “Internet censorship limits freedom of expression” 55 55 
Source: author’s estimation 
 
Priming conditions and emotional moderator 
Respondents were randomly assigned to the existential threat condition 
“Terrorist attack” (Picture 2 in Annex I) or the control condition “Dental 
pain” (Picture 3 in Annex I) before they were asked to evaluate the censorship 
frames. Intuitively, the choice of the “Terrorist attack” priming could 
strengthen the effect of followed it terrorism-related framing. At the same 
time, previous studies suggested that terrorism-related images provided explicit 
existential threats and attempted to activate death-related thoughts in 
participants (Echebarria Echabe and Perez 2015, Landau et al. 2004). The 
choice of the “Dental pain” as a control condition was adapted from papers by 
Echebarria Echabe and Perez (2015) and Gebauer et al. (2016), as it provided 
non-existential threats and potentially could remove death-related thoughts 
from consciousness. 
For both priming conditions the study used photographs, as images may 
have a stronger influence than text (Powell et al. 2015). A verbal short 
description of the photograph followed after the respondent expressed her 
first thoughts and feelings. The pictures for both priming conditions were 
taken from open internet sources. For the “Terrorist attack” condition 
participants looked at the photograph of the terrorist act in the trolley bus in 
Volgograd in 2013. The photograph pictured a damaged trolley bus 
surrounded by policemen. For ethical reasons, the photograph did not 
explicitly show corpses as a photograph used in the experiment of Echebarria 
Echabe and Perez (2015). The photographs for the “Dental pain” condition 
showed a man or a woman of a Slavic appearance with a hand on the cheek.  
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 Both priming conditionings followed a three-step procedure (Echebarria 
Echabe and Perez 2015): exposure to the picture, answer to the open question 
about the image and feelings it evokes, and prompt on the extent to which the 
respondent felt worried, confused, befuddled, perplexed and puzzled10. The 
conditions of a field experiment limited possibility to conduct other procedures 
to induce death-related thoughts in subjects. Due to limitation of time for 
interview as well as due to the ethical concerns the standard death-essay 
questions or word-completion tasks, which have been used in previous studies, 
were not appropriate. 
 
Censorship frames 
For the purpose of this study the following frames were developed: 
Frame 1 (general) - “Internet censorship to fight against terrorism”:   
“Strengthening of the state control and censorship of the internet sphere and access of law 
enforcement authorities to private correspondence of the ordinary Russian citizens, are 
intended to contribute to the fight against extremism and terrorism”. 
Frame 2 (endorsed) - “President Putin endorses internet censorship to fight against 
terrorism”:  
“The President of Russia Vladimir Putin calls for the strengthening of the state control and 
censorship of the internet sphere, and for providing access of law enforcement authorities to 
private correspondence of the ordinary Russian citizens. This is intended to contribute to the 
fight against extremism and terrorism”. 
Frame 3 (neutral) - “Internet censorship limits freedom of expression”: 
“Strengthening of the state control and censorship of the internet sphere, and access of law 
enforcement authorities to private correspondence of the ordinary Russian citizens, limit 
freedom of expression and provide legal grounds for the repression of nonconformists”. 
 
Since the study was interested to evaluate whether respondents support or 
not the frames, non-responses (“don’t know” answers) were excluded from the 
analysis. Those responses accounted for approximately 8 percent (28 
observations) of the total sample (N = 331). For the remaining observations 
the dummy variables were created, in which 1 gathered responses [absolutely 
agree/rather agree] and 0 [rather disagree/absolutely disagree].  
The evaluation of the responses to each of the frames under the priming 
conditions was supposed to indicate whether threatening priming was able to 
increase the approval of internet censorship per se and when its necessity was 
explicitly endorsed by Putin. The neutral Frame 3 is used to contrast the 
findings related to first two frames. These responses to three censorship 
frames are used as proxies for Putin’s support. Since the survey respondents at 
10 The list of the emotions was reduced to anxiety and confusion since others showed 




                                                 
 this stage were not asked about support for the President directly, but rather 
anonymously assessed hypothetical frames, this approach was less likely to 
yield social desirability bias. The aim of the analysis is to establish how the 
threatening media content elicited through priming may affect the responses to 
three censorship frames as proxies for Putin’s approval. The study 
hypothesizes that if respondents who were exposed to the “Terrorist attack” 
priming were more likely to support censorship, than high Putin approval 
ratings may be attributed to threatening media content. The paper also uses 
complimentary quantitative and qualitative data on respondents’ evaluation of 
various Russian common worldviews, which were obtained during the survey 
interviews.  
 
Ex post survey 
After evaluation of the censorship frames, the respondents answered additional 
survey questions to obtain social-demographic characteristics as well the 
respondents’ attitudes towards various Russian common beliefs and attitudes 
(worldviews). The responses to the ex post survey questions were supposed to 
provide an insight in relevant to the phenomenon of rallying-around-the-flag 
attitudes of Russians. The questions (Questionnaire in Annex II) had a similar 
formulation as the questions Levada-Center uses in their ongoing surveys and 
could be grouped as follows: 
1. Closed and open questions about support for Putin and worldviews (things go right 
in Russia, feeling proud, feeling ashamed, Russia has enemies) 
2. Socio-demographic characteristics: age, gender, income, level of education, occupation 
and family composition (children and parents), years lived in Moscow 
3. Media consumption habits: viewership of the state TV-channels and use of 
“alternative” sources such as the radio “Echo of Moscow” and internet sites slon.ru 
(“Slon”), tvrain.ru (“Dozhd’”) and medusa.io (“Meduza”). 
 
For the question on Putin’s approval non-responses (“don’t know” 
answers) were excluded from the analysis. These responses accounted for 
approximately 9 percent (30 observations) of the total sample (N = 331). For 
the remaining observations the dummy variable was created, in which 1 
gathered responses [absolutely approve/rather approve] and 0 [rather 
disapprove/absolutely disapprove].  
The possible answer categories for questions about whether things go 
right or wrong and Russia is better than any other countries ranged on a Likert 
scale from 1 [absolutely disapprove/wrong way/disagree] to 4 [absolutely 
approve/right way/ agree]. For the purpose of analysis they were further 
coded either 1 [positive answer] or 2 [negative answer]. The questions about 
pride, shame and enemies had possible answers ranged from 0 [no] to 1 [yes]. 
The income was measured by the categories 1 [need to save to buy food 
and clothes], 2 [enough for food and clothes but need to save to buy a new 
fridge or television], 3 [enough to buy a new fridge or television but need to 
save to buy a new car], 4 [enough to buy a new car]. The survey also included 
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 questions about family composition (children, parents) and years lived in 
Moscow. 
4.2 Econometric model 
In order to examine whether exposure to the threatening media content may 
alter people’s attitudes, the study uses the effect of priming and framing of 
stimuli as a proxy for the effects of the Russian state media content and 
experimentally obtained attitudes towards internet censorship as a proxy for 
Putin’s support. The econometric analysis aims to analyze whether the 
“Terrorist attack” priming affects the propensity to support internet 
censorship and through which channel the effect may occur. 
The first step of analysis estimates a model, which specifies pro-
censorship attitudes as a function of the exposure to the “Terrorist attack” 
priming. The linear probability model is estimated using ordinary least squares 
technique with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and looks as follows: 
   (1) 
   where the outcome variable corresponds to the 
respondent’s i support for censorship as it was expressed in the frame . The 
dummy variable  takes on a value of one for the “Terrorist attack” 
condition and zero otherwise. The matrix  and represent 
a set of socio-demographic and media consumption dummy variables that 
capture observable characteristics of respondents. These characteristics include 
participants’ gender, age, education, income, family composition (children and 
parents) as well as viewership of the state television and usage of an alternative 
internet sources and radio station “Echo of Moscow”. 
The second step of analysis investigates whether induced by the priming 





The equation (2) includes interaction term between exposure to the “Terrorist 
attack” priming image and reported anxiety captured by the dummy variable 
 that measures emotional response coding one for feeling anxiety 
and zero otherwise. The inclusion of interaction term aims to detect the effect 
of threatening media content elicited through priming on support for internet 
censorship and, thus, Putin. 
The potential concern is that the regressor  is endogenous and 
may be correlated with the regression error term. To address endogeneity issue 
and to obtain consistent parameter estimate, the  is instrumented 
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 with the variable  capturing exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image, 
and demographic and media consumption covariates. Therefore, as the third 
step, the paper estimates the following model that consists of a pro-censorship 





     (4) 
 
where for each individual i,  is capturing a propensity to 
agree with internet censorship as expressed in the frame f , and 
 represent a set of demographic and media consumption variables. 
The represents reported emotion and  is a dummy for 
exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image. The variable  captures 
exogenous experimental treatment that is hypothesized to induce anxiety. The 
model is exactly specified (one endogenous regressor and one instrument). The 
instrument  is assumed to be uncorrelated with unobserved factors, 
which may influence pro-censorship attitudes. Presumably, the error terms  
and  are normally distributed with zero means and positive variances.  
5 Data and descriptive analysis 
This chapter presents a dataset obtained from the survey experiment. Firstly, it 
describes the data collection process and composition of the data sample by 
allocated priming conditions and tested outcome frames. Secondly, the chapter 
presents the descriptive statistics of socio-economic indicators of respondents. 
Thirdly, the chapter provides information on media consumption of the survey 
participants. Fourthly, it presents the current Putin’s approval ratings recorded 
during the survey. Fifthly, the last section investigates the rallying-around-the-
flag phenomena by providing the respondents’ attitudes towards various 
aspects of Russia’s development. 
5.1 Data collection and data sample 
The data were gathered during the survey experiment, which took place in 
Moscow in August 2016. The experiment was conducted during consequent 9 
days from 8 a.m. till 8 p.m. The detailed map of the experiment locations is 
provided in the Annex I (Picture 1). In order to avoid the repetition of 
respondents and the decrease of the traffic during particular hours, every day 
the experiment was conducted in 3-4 different places, moving from distant city 
areas to city center and back during the day. As it was indicated in Chapter 3, 
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 the priming conditions and three outcome frames were allocated randomly and 
independently of the city area, day, hour and weather conditions. 
On average every second approached person declined to participate in the 
survey and was not recorded as an observation. Nine people (less than 3% of 
the full sample) dropped out during the interview for a variety of reasons. 
Three of them declined to answer to “these type of questions”11, others had to rush 
to the meeting. The responses of these respondents were included in the data 
set, although answers to some questions are missing. 
The dataset consists of 331 observations. Figure 3 presents the number of 
observation per priming condition and allocated frame: 
Figure 3 
Number of observations by sampling unit 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Overall, the sample consists of 146 men (44 percent) and 185 women (56 
percent) of 18-80 years old. On average the respondents are 40 years old and 
lived in Moscow for 28 years. A little bit more than half (56 percent) was born 
there. Half of respondents have a middle income (can afford to buy a new 
fridge or television but need to save to buy a car).  The majority of respondents 
(68 percent) reported to have a high education, among them more women (71 
percent), which is 9 percentage points higher than among men and the 
difference is significant at the 10 percent level   (p = 0.079). 58 percent of 
respondents have children and 21 percent live with their parents. Almost a half 
of youngest respondents (48 percent of 18-25 years old) live with their parents. 
43 percent of respondents watch only state TV-channels (Pervy, Rossia, NTV). 
11 Author’s interviews with 30 years old woman, 65 years old woman 30 and 65 years 
old man (the age is approximate). 
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 57 percent in addition to the state TV listens to the radio “Echo of Moscow” 
(17 percent of the total number of respondents) and uses some of prompted 
internet sites (12 percent).  The difference across groups in both cases is 
insignificant. Table 2 (in Annex III) displays the demographic statistics of the 
sample. 
5.3 Randomization balance 
Descriptive statistics by allocated priming conditions (Table A, Annex III) 
confirm that randomization is balanced across socio-economic characteristics 
of respondents. Equality of means cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level 
for all comparisons across priming groups.  
Some inter-group differences were observed in comparison of groups 
randomly assigned to different frames. The last column in Table A (Annex III) 
presents p-values of difference-in-means test. The group assigned to the Frame 
2 (“President Putin endorses internet censorship to fight against the terrorism”) was a bit 
younger and had significantly less Moscow-born respondents than the group 
assigned to the Frame 1 (“Internet censorship to fight against the terrorism”). The 
respondents in the group assigned to the Frame 3 (“Internet censorship limits 
freedom of expression”) on average had significantly higher level of education than 
those assigned to the Frame 2. The group assigned to the Frame 2 also has 
significantly fewer respondents with children than the groups assigned to the 
Frame 1 and 3. The lowest share of listeners of the radio “Echo of Moscow” 
was found among respondents of the group assigned to the Frame 2 (8 
percent), the highest – among those assigned to frame 1 (23 percent). The 
difference is significant at 1 percent level. Group differences are small and 
insignificant for gender, age, number of years lived in Moscow, income, living 
with parents, state TV and usage of alternative Internet sources.  
5.4 Socio-economic characteristics of TV-viewers 
57 percent of respondents used both TV and alternative media sources. 
Wherein 43 percent of the sample watched only state TV-channels and 11 
percent of respondents used only alternative media such as radio “Echo of 
Moscow” and internet sites Slon, Dozhd’ and Meduza. The details of TV-
viewership and socio-economic characteristics are presented in the Table B 
(Annex III). 
The average state TV-channel viewer is a middle age woman with children, 
who has graduated from high school or college and has some financial 
constraints. Overall, the share of school or college graduates and people with 
middle-low income among users of alternative media is significantly low than 
of people with higher educational (p < 0.01) and income (p < 0.10) levels. The 
lowest TV-viewing was found among youngest respondents. Only 33 percent 
of 18-25 and 45 percent of 26-35 age clusters reported that they watched TV. 
The pattern remained similar for both men and women. The difference with 
other respondents is significant at the 1 percent level. 
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 To some extent unexpectedly, living with parents did not make any 
difference in media consumption as respondents either watch TV together 
with their parents or “get an update” from them: “my parents can watch TV the whole 
day… our dinner time often remind me a ‘political information’ class at school”12. Being 
born in Moscow or being moved there from another region does not influence 
media consumption either.  
5.5 Reported Putin’s approval rating 
78 percent of the survey respondents stated that they support President Putin 
and 21 percent of them absolutely approve his activity. The level of Putin’s 
approval among male and female respondents is almost equal (77 and 79 
percent, respectively). The young respondents (18-45 years old) support Putin 
more than the older group (46-80 years old). The difference-in-means is 11 
percentage points (Ms = 0.83, 0.72) and significant at a 5 percent level.  
Correlation between Putin’s approval ratings and socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents are presented in Table C (Annex III). No 
difference in rating among respondents of various income level and family 
composition (having children, living with parents) was observed. Being born in 
Moscow or move to the capital might not influence the support for president 
either. However, the level of education matters. More educated respondents 
tend to approve Putin’s politics less than school and college graduates. His 
rating among university degree holders is 75 percent and the difference with 83 
percent for other group is significant at 10 percent level (p = 0.09). 
Interestingly, some respondents motivated their support for Putin by his 
already high approval rating (“80 percent of people support him”13) or by expressing 
an opinion that there is no alternative (“who else?”14). This finding may 
suggested that, as discussed before, the direct questioning might lead to socially 
acceptable responses. 
Media consumption habits are also related to Putin’s support. Thus, 
television viewers approve his politics significantly more that non-viewers (85 
and 69 percent, respectively, p = 0.001). Contrary, only 50 percent of the 
alternative media’s consumers reported that they support the president. 
Interesting, that the share of Putin’s supporters among listeners of radio Echo 
of Moscow is higher than the share among users of Dozhd’, Slon, Meduza 
online magazines (68 and 58 percent, respectively). Snegovaya has noticed that 
the radio station dedicated almost a half of its air-time to the discussions with   
the “pro-Kremlin pundits” and that sort of “compromise” allowed the station 
to continue conveying independent content during another half (2015: 32). 
That co-optation of the station, however, might have a negative effect on its 
penetration. Some respondent mentioned that the used to listen to the station 
in the past, but stopped doing it some time ago as its “content worsened”15. 
12 Author’s interview with 28 years old woman. 
13 Author’s interview with 47 years old man. 
14 Author’s interview with 24 years old woman.  
15 Author’s interview with 58 years old woman. 
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 5.6 “Rallying-around-the-flag” 
As discussed in Chapter 2 a high level of Putin’s approval rating could be 
associated with a patriotic consolidation. As Russian citizens are united in the 
assessment of the current country’s development, the effect of rallying-around-
the-flag on Putin’s approval rating may be observed. Table 5 presents 
correlation coefficients of the president support and various worldviews that 
respondents of the survey hold nowadays. 
Table 2 
Correlation of Putin approval rating and worldviews 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Seeing Russia’s development in the right direction, being proud about the 
country and agreeing with the statement “Russia is the best” are strongly and 
positively related to Putin’s approval ratings. More than a half of the survey 
respondents agreed with the statements that “things in Russia go the right 
way” and “Russia is better than any other countries” (58 and 62 percent, 
respectively). 78 percent of respondents are proud of modern Russia. The 
positive attitudes towards Russia’s development and the performance of Putin 
were mostly driven by the notion of the “correct external politics”16, which allowed 
to make the country “stronger”17 in the eyes of its rivals (“good that they are afraid of 
us now like it was in USSR”18). As respondents were satisfied with the “comfort” 
of living in Moscow19, they were also grateful to the President that he kept the 
peace despite all worrying international news20. The respondents with negative 
sentiments about thing going on in Russia were referring to the overall 
destabilization of economy21 bad politicians in Putin’s team22, a continuous 
16 Author’s interview with 61 years old woman. 
17 Author’s interview with 51 years old woman. 
18 Author’s interview with 63 years old man. 
19 Author’s interview with 70 years old woman. 
20 Author’s interviews with 25 and 30 years old women. 
21 Author’s interview with 39 years old woman. 
22 Author’s interviews with 37 and 64 years old women. 
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 fight with the entire world23 and the lack of politicians who could be an 
alternative to Putin24.  
Majority of the respondents, who agreed that things going right, also 
reported that they were proud about modern Russia. Figure 4 illustrates the 
differences of attitudes expressed by Putin’s supporters and opponents. The 
differences in means agreement with each of tested statement are large and 
statistically significant. 
Figure 4 
Mean agreement with worldview’s statements 
  
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
 
Most of the arguments had the same grounds – a “strong” Russia’s position in 
the international arena25, “rightful” Crimea annexation26 and overall “greatness” of 
the country reestablished by Putin27.  
At the same time, 78 percent of respondents confessed that they feel 
shame about things going on in Russia. Corruption, social security issues, low 
income of pensioners, incompetent politicians and continuous fights with 
other countries were the main reasons of that feeling (almost all respondents 
noticed these aspects). This feeling is more common among Putin’s opponents 
(92 percent), as Figure 5 illustrates.  
23 Author’s interview with 40 years old man. 
24 Author’s interview with 37 years old man. 
25 Author’s interviews with 26 years old woman and 70 years old man. 
26 Author’s interview with 24 years old woman. 
27 Author’s interview with 63 and 36 years old women. 
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 Figure 5 
Feeling shame  
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
The majority of respondents (84 percent) were absolutely convinced that 
Russia has enemies (Figure 6). Although a few respondents did not agree that 
Russia has enemies, some noticed that those enemies “were created” by the state 
media28, many named both internal (politicians, oligarchs, Putin’s opposition) 
and external enemies (USA, Ukraine, ISIS, Turkey, Europe).  
Overall, the opinion that Russia has enemies is weakly related to overall 
support for the president, but those who endorse Putin’s politics on average 
were more inclined to describe the world around Russia as “full of enemies”29. 
The difference in mean agreement with this statement among Putin’s 
supporters and opponents is 9 percentage points and statistically significant (p 
= 0.08). 
The reported high patriotism and idealization of Putin’s intentions and 
actions were strongly related to his high approval ratings measured by direct 
questioning. This finding suggests that there is, indeed, a consolidation of 
rallying-around-the-flag in Russia. A deterioration of economic situation was 
mostly attributed to the negative influence of actions of other countries and to 
the weakness of Russian government to tackle the issues. Only Putin’s 
opponents mentioned the role of Putin in the decline of people’s living 
standards. But even for them, his ongoing war with external and internal 
enemies seemed to justify the economic decline. Interestingly, the respondents 
did not link the threat of terrorism with Russia’s involvement in conflicts. 
While some mentioned that the government itself might stage terrorism attacks 
in order to threaten the citizens, others were anxious that the same 
government might not be capable to protect them. If Russians were afraid, 
28 Author’s interview with 60 years old woman and 47 years old man. 
29 Author's interviews with 45 years old man and 57 years old woman, respectively. 
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 they would probably consider that the defensive role of Putin is limited by the 
actions of his team. 
Figure 6 
Russia has enemies 
  
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
6 Results 
This chapter reports the results of the experiment and the statistical analysis of 
the obtained data. The main objective of the study is to find out whether the 
effects of threatening media content drive high approval rating of Putin.  The 
chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the obtained 
experimental evidence on the effect of priming on feeling anxiety. The second 
section evaluates the effect of priming and framing on attitudes towards 
censorship of internet. The third and fourth sections explore the potential role 
of the media in driving support for President Putin. Section 6.3 discusses the 
use of the support for internet censorship as a proxy for Putin’s approval. 
Finally, section 6.4 provides estimates of the media effects on Putin’s support. 
6.1 Effectiveness of priming on induction of anxiety-related 
emotions 
The study found out that the level of anxiety of Russian citizens is quite 
considerable as 47 present of respondents of the survey reported that they 
have fear-related emotions, regardless of the particular priming condition. As 
expected, the results of the experiment provide evidence that the “Terrorist 
attack” priming was able to induce the confusion-anxiety emotions, and the 
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 effect of the priming was large (Cohen’s d = 0.86)30 and significantly higher 
than the effect of the “Dental pain” priming (Ms = 0.66 and 0.27, respectively, 
t(329) = 7.84, p < 0.001) (Figure 7). The result is comparable to 30 percentage 
points of the direct effect of the “Terrorist attack” conditioning on anxiety 
found by Echebarria Echabe and Perez in their laboratory experiments (2015). 
Figure 7 
Induction of anxiety by priming condition 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
In their comments to the images most respondents were concerned about 
protection of their relatives, rather than about their own safety: “…I am not 
afraid about myself, but what if something happens to my parents, children…”31. For 
some, terrorism became a “usual thing” 32.  Overall, in the experiment women 
were more emotionally affected than men (t(329) = 3.59, p < 0.001). The 
Figure 8 displays the emotional response by female and male respondents 
under each priming condition. However, the difference in feeling anxiety 
between men and women is only significant under the “Terrorist attack” 
priming (t(164) = 3.33, p < 0.001). 
30 Cohen’s d was calculated using the formula:   
(Cohen 1992). 
31  Author’s interview with 43 years old man. 
32 Author’s interview with 20 years old woman. 
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 Figure 8 
Feeling anxiety by gender 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
As expected, regardless of priming condition, the respondents with children 
were feeling some sort of fear more often than those who do not have children 
(50 and 43 percent respectively) but the difference is not significant. These 
respondents also followed the general pattern of the emotional response to 
priming: among people with children 70 percent of those exposed to the 
“Terrorist attack” priming reported fear-related emotions, comparing to 28 
percent of respondents with children under the “Dental pain” condition. Other 
socio-economic characteristics were not related to the propensity to feel 
anxiety either. The associated p-values are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Mean Emotion by socio-economic characteristics 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
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 The general pattern of the emotional response to priming conditions, in 
which the “Terrorist attack” image induced higher feelings of confusion-
anxiety than the “Dental pain” image, was observed across all socio-economic 
characteristics.  
Another expected finding is that those who watch state TV-channels were 
feeling anxiety more often than non-viewers (52 and 41 percent, respectively), 
t(320) = 1.82, p = 0.07 (Table 7). Moreover, the difference in means of anxiety 
feeling between viewers of only state TV-channels and others is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, t(320) = 2.02, p = 0.04. This finding suggests 
that viewers of the state TV-channels, especially those who do not use any 
other media sources, are more prone to anxiety-related feelings than 
respondents with more diverse media consumption habits.  
Emotional responses among users and non-users of alternative mass 
medias were not different, suggesting that listeners of the radio “Echo of 
Moscow” and users of internet magazines Slon, Dozhd’ and Meduza were not 
different from the average respondent of the survey in their propensity to feel 
anxiety. The associated p-values are provided in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Mean Emotion by the consumed media 
Source: Author’s estimation 
The priming was able to produce a high level of anxiety across groups with 
various media consumption habits. Interestingly, the emotional response of 
users of only alternative media to the “Terrorist attack” priming was lower 
than of viewers of only state TV-channels (mean emotion 0.53 and 0.74, 
respectively). However, the difference is not precisely estimated (p = 0.12), and 
the sample size of users of only alternative media under the threatening 




 6.2 Effect of priming and framing on the support for 
internet censorship 
The results of the experiment suggest that the state control and censorship of 
internet and access of intelligence service authorities to citizen’s 
correspondence was accepted by 48.5 percent of respondents, regardless of 
priming condition (M = 0.49, N = 303).  Figure 9 reports pro-censorship 
attitudes for the total sample by priming conditions. 
Figure 9 
Pro-censorship attitudes by priming condition, total sample 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
The pro-censorship attitudes did not vary between male and female 
respondents (Ms = 0.46 and 0.50, respectively, p = 0.49), as Figure 10 
illustrates, but men tend to be against the state control more than women. 
Figure 10 
Pro-censorship attitudes by gender 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the effect of framing on the attitudes towards censorship.  
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 Figure 11 
Pro-censorship attitudes by frame, total sample 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
Putin’s endorsement did not influence overall support of pro-censorship, as 
the difference in means versus original frame is 8 percentage points and not 
significant (p = 0.28). However, the endorsement by the President created a 
larger group of opponents of the censorship than the original frame 
(disagreement responses accounted for 50% and 42%, respectively). Some 
explanations might be found in respondents’ comments to this survey 
question. For example, some participants suggested that “the state should employ 
other methods than censoring internet”33 and “intelligence services must do their job better”34. 
Still, although slightly lower, the support for censorship in the frame endorsed 
by Putin was considerable. One young woman pointed out that she would have 
argued with the necessity of internet censorship to fight against terrorism, but 
since it was endorsed by Putin, she agreed with it as “he [Putin] knows better what 
to do because he worked in intelligence services himself”35. 
Another finding of the study is the effect of framing on pro-censorship 
attitudes of the respondents. Thus, when censorship of internet was framed as 
a potential loss of freedom of expression it got less approval. The difference in 
means between Frame 1 and Frame 3 is 21 percentage points and statistically 
significant (p = 0.003) at 1 percent level. Similar effect is observed comparing 
agreement with pro-censorship between endorsed by Putin Frame 2 and 3 (13 
percentage points, p = 0.057). The lower support for censorship in Frame 3 
implies that Russians may consider censorship of internet as limiting 
democratic freedom.  
Does existential threat induced by priming condition alter pro-censorship 
attitudes? The results of the experiment suggest that it might not be the case. 
33, 34  Author’s interviews with 34 years old man and 51 years old woman, respectively. 




                                                 
 Figure 12 illustrates that across three tested frames, the censorship of internet 
per se had a strong support among respondents, regardless of having been 
exposed to the “Terrorist attack” or “Dental pain” priming (p = 0.61). 
Existential threats induced by the “Terrorist attack” condition did not affect 
pro-censorship attitudes of the respondents exposed to the original frame 
(Frame 1), as the mean support is equal in both conditions (the details are 
provided in Table D in Annex III). This finding is similar to the results 
obtained by Gebauer at al. (2016). In their experiment the willingness to 
employ military forces was not influenced by the threatening priming because, 
as they suggested, the threatening effect of the tested article itself was already 
quite high and “comparable to an acute existential threat” (Gebauer et al. 2016: 
1). In like manner, the threatening effect of the frame’s wording, which 
included words “fight” and “terrorism”, might be already substantial for 
respondents to agree with the necessity of the state control and censorship of 
internet. 
Figure 12 
Effect of framing and priming on pro-censorship attitudes by frame 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
The support for censorship endorsed by Putin was not affected by priming 
either. The difference in means between groups under the “Terrorist attack” 
and “Dental pain” primes is only 3 percentage points and not significant (p = 
0.77). 
A very small effect of existential threats on the support for the censorship 
was observed when respondents evaluated the neutral Frame 3. The mean 
support under the “Terrorist attack” was a bit higher than under the “Dental 
pain” priming (M = 0.40 and M = 0.35, respectively). That could suggest that 
Russians may trade off their democratic freedoms if the security of the state is 
at stake, but the difference in means is not significant (p = 0.58).  
Additionally, the results suggest that the effect of priming was weaker than 
the effect of framing. Comparing the “Dental pain” conditions from Frame 3 
and the Frame 1, t-test revealed a moderate effect of framing on the support 
42 
 
 for censorship: M = 0.35 (Frame 3) and 0.58 (Frame 1), t(98) = 2.42, p = 0.02, 
d = 0.49. Similarly to findings of Gebauer et al. (2016), the frames’ wording 
could influence the tested attitude. 
6.3 Pro-censorship attitudes as a proxy for Putin’s support 
The present study hypothesized that the attitudes towards internet censorship 
might serve as a proxy for overall support for President Putin. Based on the 
suggestion made by Blair et al. (2014) the evaluation of the respondents’ 
agreement with a controversial policy might help to infer the actual level of the 
leader’s approval. The data gathered in the present experiment suggest that 
pro-censorship attitudes are strongly related to Putin’s approval rates recorded 
from the direct questioning (Table 5). 
Table 5 
Correlation of Putin approval rating and pro-censorship attitudes 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
More than a half (59 percent) of Putin’s supporters agreed with the necessity of 
the state control and censorship in internet as an instrument to fight with 
terrorism. Only 2 percent of those who said that they did not endorse the 
president could accept this policy (Figure 13). 
Figure 13 
Pro-censorship attitudes, cumulative for Frame 1-3 
 




Interestingly, as Figure 14 demonstrates, the censorship endorsed by Putin 
(Frame 2) obtained slightly less (8 percentage points) support among Putin’s 
proponents than the general frame (Frame 3), although the mean Putin 
support was not different across frames (M = 0.79; 0.76 and 0.79, respectively).  
Figure 14 
Pro-censorship attitudes by frame 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Unexpectedly, the effect of the endorsed frame on pro-censorship attitudes of 
Putin’s supporters is much smaller than the effect of the general frame 
(Cohen’s ds = 0.17 and 0.51, respectively), as Table 6 presents. 
Table 6 
Effect of framing on pro-censorship attitudes of Putin’s supporters 
 




 Additionally to the effects of framing and priming discussed in the Section 6.2, 
this finding offers an interesting insight on possible alteration of Putin support. 
As censorship gets less public consent when Putin voices its necessity, Putin’s 
endorsement of a controversial policy may potentially decrease his support 
among the citizens.  
This finding also contributes to the general discussion about the strength 
of the framing and priming effects. As discussed in Section 6.2 the framing had 
a moderate effect (Cohen’s d = 0.49) on pro-censorship attitudes. Under the 
same priming condition (“Dental pain”) the effect of framing on pro-
censorship attitudes of Putin’s supporters was large (t(67) = 3.28, p < 0.01, d = 
0.79). This finding may suggest that individuals that endorse Putin’s politics are 
more susceptible to media framing. Table E (Annex III) provides mean 
censorship support among Putin’s supporters by priming condition. 
6.4 Effect of threatening media content on Putin’s support 
This section provides the results of econometric analysis of experimentally 
obtained data. The aim of the analysis is to investigate whether threatening 
media content may influence the approval ratings of President Putin. 
Threatening media content is elicited through the “Terrorist attack” priming. 
Consequently, three censorship frames are used as proxies for supporting 
Putin. The paper hypothesized that if those who were exposed to the 
“Terrorist attack” priming were more likely to support censorship, then Putin’s 
high approval ratings may be attributed to media content. 
Firstly, the section presents estimates of pro-censorship attitudes as a 
function of the exposure to the “Terrorist attack” priming. Secondly, the 
analysis investigates whether induced by the priming anxiety drives the priming 
effect on pro-censorship attitudes. The latter analysis is based on estimation of 
interaction between exposure to the image and reported emotion using 
estimations of a model with interaction term and an instrumental variable 
model. The descriptive statistics is provided in Table F (Annex III). 
 
Pro-censorship attitudes as a function of the “Terrorist attack” 
priming 
The econometric analysis showed that exposure to the “Terrorist attack” 
priming has small and insignificant effect on pro-censorship attitudes of the 
respondents. Table 7 presents the results of regression analysis. 
The coefficient associated with viewership of only state TV-channels 
(Column 1) suggests that the respondents who watch only state television have 
18 percentage points higher probability to support internet censorship, keeping 
other aspects constant. This effect can be driven by the male part of the 
sample as the effect of TV-viewership for men is larger and statistically 
different from the effect it has on women (p = 0.06). As expected, coefficients 
of living with parents and having children are also associated with support for 
censorship. As the respondents that live with parents are on average younger 
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 (65 percent of those who live with parents are 18-35 years old), they tend to 
support censorship in internet less. Opposite, having children may increase the 
support for censorship as a means of child protection. Middle age (46 years old 
and older) and usage of alternative media may decrease the support for 
censorship, though only for male respondents. 
Table 7 
Pro-censorship attitudes as a function of “Terrorist attack” priming, cumulative for Frames 1-3  
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
According to Terror Management Theory, the fear of death and related to 
it anxiety may increase people’s faith in leaders (Greenberg et al. 1997, Landau 
et al. 2004). To check whether exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image and 
induced by it anxiety had an additional effect on pro-censorship attitudes, the 




 Interaction of the exposure to “Terrorist attack” image and 
reported anxiety 
Table 8 provides results of regression of the cumulative support for internet 
censorship on exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image, reported anxiety, their 
interaction and a set of socio-demographic and media consumption covariates 
(Table G in Annex III provides additional details). 
Table 8 
Pro-censorship attitudes and exposure-anxiety interaction, cumulative for Frames 1-3 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
The additional effect produced by interaction of the exposure to the priming 
image and reported anxiety looks substantial but statistically significant only for 
gender sub-samples. Addition of interaction term between exposure and 
anxiety does not change the coefficient associated with viewership of only state 
TV-channels. Other coefficients repeat the patterns of the previous estimation.  
However, the difference in estimates for female and male sub-samples 
suggests that women may be more sensitive to the threatening priming, but the 
additional effect of priming and fear-related feelings may have a negative 
influence on the supportive attitude. Among other variables that might have a 
positive influence on Putin’s approval – young age, high education and 
viewership of the state television, only the latter had an effect on increase of 
pro-censorship attitudes. The viewership of only state TV-channels has large 
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 and significant effect, accounting for 18 percentage points increase in 
probability to support control and censorship in internet.  
The analysis by frame reveals that framing may also contribute to the 
effect of threatening priming on pro-censorship attitudes. Table 9 illustrates 
the results obtained for each tested frame. 
Table 9 
Pro-censorship attitudes and exposure-anxiety interaction by frame 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
 
Thus, the substantial but different in sign effects of exposure to the “Terrorist 
attack” image and reported anxiety on pro-censorship in Frame 1 contribute to 
the relatively small additional interaction effect. It seems that the more 
frightened the people are, the less they might support the state interference in 
their private life. This finding might suggest that people do not trust methods 
the Russian intelligence services employ or have low confidence in their 
capacity to protect the citizens. This notion has some qualitative evidence as 
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 some respondents suggested that the state (or Putin) might employ other 
methods to fight with terrorism rather than “breach people’s privacy”36. 
The additional effect of the interaction term is still insignificant but 
substantial in Frame 2 and Frame 3. The negative sign of coefficients 
associated with effect of the exposure to threatening image and relatively small 
coefficients of anxiety variable could possible be attributed by the certain 
“threshold of negativity”  - the more people are exposed to the threatening news, 
the less they feel frightened, as some respondents noticed. 
Moreover, some of included covariates also contribute to the formation of 
pro-censorship attitudes but their effect might be different for different 
frames. Having children could increase pro-censorship attitudes but only in 
Frame 1. The coefficient associated with living with parents is substantial and 
significant only in Frame 2. The variation may also be explained by the 
differences in socio-demographic characteristics of respondents assigned to the 
frames. The respondents appointed to evaluate Frame 1 on average had 
children more often than respondents evaluated Frame 2. The latter group was 
a bit younger – the respondents were on average 38 years old comparing to 41 
years old in Frame 1 and 3. Therefore, more of them lived with parents and 
had no children. Viewership of state TV-channels and usage of alternative 
media may have an offsetting effect on each other (Frame 1). 
The findings presented in these two sections suggest that viewership of 
state television may affect respondents’ attitudes towards a political issue or a 
leader. However, the role of the threatening priming in this process is not clear, 
as the study was not able to detect its effect. The concern about endogeneity of 
anxiety-related feelings and its influence on the robustness of the estimates 
remains. The following section presents the results of instrumental variable 
estimation. 
 
Pro-censorship as a function of anxiety (IV) 
The potential concern is that feeling of anxiety is endogenous and may be 
correlated with unobserved characteristics of the respondents. To address the 
endogeneity issue and to obtain consistent parameter estimate, the variable 
recording the reported anxiety is instrumented with the variable capturing 
exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image and demographic and media 
consumption covariates. The exogenous experimental priming of an exposure 
to the “Terrorist attack” image was supposed to induce fear-related emotions 
in respondents but be uncorrelated with unobserved factors influencing pro-
censorship attitudes. Table 10 presents results of the estimation (the detailed 
Table H is in Annex III). 
36 Author’s interviews with 43 years old man and 27 years old woman. 
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 Table 10 
Pro-censorship attitudes, instrumental variable specification 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
The first stage regression reveals a high degree of correlation between an 
exposure to the “Terrorist attack” image and the reported anxiety, conditional 
on the other covariates. F-statistics is large and statistically significant (F(1,285) 
= 50.67, p < 0.01), suggesting the instrument is not correlated with disturbance 
error and strongly related to the reported anxiety. However, the results of the 
second stage regression show that the IV coefficient associated with anxiety is 
not different from zero (p = 0.64). The finding suggests that conditioning on 
other factors, anxiety may not play an important role in determining pro-
censorship attitudes. The estimation of the equation with linear regression 
(Column 3) yields consistent results. 
The results of the data analysis presented in this chapter suggest that state-
control media plays a role in driving support for President Putin. In line with 
previous findings on media influence (Entman 1989, Shanahan and Morgan 
2004), the direct effects of media influence may be not very large. However, 
the evidence of the present study could not support the hypothesis that 
Russian state media outlets use threatening content to reinforce citizens’ 




 7 Discussion of  the results 
The present research paper aimed to evaluate the effects of state-controlled 
media on the persistence of high approval ratings of President Putin. The study 
examined whether the threatening media content elicited through terrorism-
related priming may alter respondents’ attitudes towards a controversial policy 
of internet censorship. The latter was used as a proxy for the President’s 
support. The study used data gathered during the survey experiment. The 
methodological choices were informed by previous research on media effects 
and psychological foundations of the effects of existential threats on people’s 
behavior studied under the ambit of Terror Management Theory. 
The study has four main findings. The first set of results is related to 
media effects elicited through “Terrorist attack” priming. The experiment 
provided evidence that the “Terrorist attack” priming was able to induce the 
confusion-anxiety emotions, and the effect of the priming was large (Cohen’s d 
= 0.86) and significantly higher than the effect of the “Dental pain” priming 
(Ms = 0.66 and 0.27, respectively, t(329) = 7.84, p < 0.001). The result is 
comparable to 30 percentage points of the direct effect of the “Terrorist 
attack” conditioning on anxiety found by Echebarria Echabe and Perez in their 
laboratory experiments (2015). At the same time, analogous to the results 
obtained by Gebauer at al. (2016) the study found out that threatening priming 
might not affect tested attitudes. The threatening effect of the frame’s wording, 
which included words “fight” and “terrorism”, might be already substantial for 
respondents to agree with the necessity of the censorship policy. 
The second finding further clarifies the influence of message framing. The 
study found evidence that framing effect the media could be stronger than the 
effect of priming. Comparing pro-censorship attitudes under the “Dental pain” 
condition in neutral (Frame 3) and general (Frame 1) frames, the analysis 
revealed a moderate effect of framing on the support for censorship (d = 0.49). 
This finding is comparable with previous research on media influence, which 
suggested that frames could affect the tested attitudes (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007, Scheufele and Iyengar 2012). The framing effect was stronger 
for Putin’s supporters (d = 0.79) suggesting that individuals who endorse 
Putin’s politics may be more susceptible to media framing. Moreover, the 
effect of the endorsed frame on pro-censorship attitudes of Putin’s supporters 
was much smaller than the effect of the general frame (Cohen’s ds = 0.17 and 
0.51, respectively). This finding offers an interesting insight on possible 
alteration of Putin’s support. As censorship gets less public consent when 
Putin voices its necessity, Putin’s endorsement of a controversial policy may 
potentially decrease his support among the citizens. 
The third finding is related to the conceptualization of proxy for Putin’s 
approval. The analysis of the data suggested that pro-censorship attitudes 
might serve as proxy for Putin’s support due to their strong correlation with 
his approval rates recorded by the direct questioning.  The study found 
evidence that Putin’s public approval may not be indisputable as his supporters 
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 could be against some of his policies, while his opponents could endorse his 
actions. The evaluation of the respondents’ agreement with a controversial 
policy helped to illustrate the actual level of Putin’s approval, as suggested by 
Blair et al. (2014).  
The fourth finding corresponds to the overarching goal of the study to 
evaluate effects of the threatening media content on a persistence of high 
approval ratings of President Putin. The results of the present research suggest 
that state-control media play a certain role in driving support for President 
Putin. In line with previous findings on media influence (Entman 1989 
Shanahan and Morgan 2004), the direct effects of media, though, may be small. 
The present research found out that the viewers of the state TV-channels, 
especially those who do not use any other media sources, could be more prone 
to anxiety-related feelings than individuals with more diverse media 
consumption habits. However, the study was not able to detect the effect of 
threatening priming on tested attitudes. That led to the conclusion that the 
evidence obtained by the present experiment could not support the hypothesis 
that Russian state media outlets use threatening content to reinforce citizens’ 
approval of the President’s actions. 
8 Conclusion 
This research paper studied the effects of the media on the support for a 
leader. The study had three main objectives. Firstly, it investigated whether 
experimental priming is able to induce anxiety-related emotions in the survey 
respondents. Secondly, the research analyzed how priming affected 
respondents’ attitudes towards controversial internet censorship policy. 
Thirdly, the paper drew inferences about the potential role of the media in 
driving citizens’ support for Putin. This chapter summarizes the main findings 
of the current research and compares them with the results of previous studies. 
The study used data obtained during survey experiment conducted on the 
streets of Moscow with randomly selected respondents. The dataset consists of 
331 observations (146 males and 185 females of 18-80 years old).  
The results of the study suggest that while threatening media priming may 
induce the confusion-anxiety emotions in viewers, its effect on their attitudes is 
not obvious. The framing effect was stronger, especially for Putin’s supporters. 
The evidence of the study implies that the Putin’s support among Russians 
could be disputable and the framing experiment may help to infer the actual 
level of his approval. The paper shows that while state-control media played a 
certain role in driving support for President Putin, his high approval ratings 
need not be because of threatening media content. The study results suggest 
that in Russian context other aspects rather than threatening may assist in 
building public support for a leader. Possibly, Putin’s charismatic personality 
and the perceived reestablishment of the perceived greatness of Russia may 
have a stronger influence on people’s faith in the President than a search for 
symbolic protection against existential threats. 
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 The study adds to the existing literature on priming and framing effects of 
media on the formation of public opinion (see, for example, Entman 1989 and 
Shanahan and Morgan 2004) and contributes to terror management research 
(see Greenberg et al. 1997 and Gebauer et al. amongst others). Though the 
present experiment provides some insights on peculiarities of the behavioral 
research outside lab, it would have been expanded by use of panel data as it 
may provide a supportive evidence of the effects of media on alteration of 
particular attitudes. Additionally, the content analysis of media messages could 
address the issue of relatively small media influence by detecting the cultivation 
effects of various media and narratives. Moreover, experimentation that 
includes investigation of various psychological traits may improve 
understanding of cognitive barriers that can potentially limit respondents’ 
susceptibility to treatment. Future research can enhance understanding of what 
drives people’s faith in political leaders by assessing his or her personality traits 
and leadership style and by comparing experimental results from various 
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 Annex II 
Questionnaire 
1. Priming (randomized) (Emotion 1-4: totally disagree – absolutely 
agree) 
1.1 Please look at the picture and tell me what you see 
1.2 Can you please tell me which physical or emotional feeling you 
have at this moment? 
1.3 Which emotions? 
1.4 Does the picture provoke feeling of anxiety, confusion… (top-
of-mind response) 
 
2. Framing (Censorship (1-4) 
2.1 I will read you one sentence. Please listen and tell me to which 
extent you agree with it 
2.2 Censorship frame (randomized) 
2.3 If agreed: Since you agreed, will you sign a (hypothetical) petition 
to stop internet censorship? 
 
3. Survey 
3.1 Do you in general support Putin as president of Russia?      
(1-4) 
3.2 Do you think in Russia things are going right or wrong way? (1-
4) 
3.3 Are you proud about modern Russia? (0-1) (no – yes) 
3.4 To which extent you may agree/disagree with the statement 
that Russia is better than any other country? (1-4) 
3.5 Is there anything in internal or external affair that makes you 
feel shame for the country? (0-1) 
3.6 What exactly? 
3.7 Do you think that Russia has enemies? 
3.8 If so, who? 
3.9 Did you hear about Yarovaya’s anti-terrorism law? 
3.10 If yes, do you support it or you think the law should be re-
pealed? 
3.11 How old are you? 
3.12 How can you define the level of you income (income statements) 
3.13 You graduated from university, right? If not, what level of educa-
tion? 
3.14 Do you have children? 
3.15 Are you parent live together with you? 
3.16 Which TV-channels, radio stations and internet sources you 
normally use? (prompt) 
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